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The Damage Carve-Out of the Louisiana Products
Liability Act: Are Manufacturers Potentially Liable
for Warranty of Fitness?

INTRODUCTION

Harry the hauler is in the business of hauling sand. Harry tells a
manufacturer-seller of dump trucks that he wants to purchase a
model that can haul sand in order to perform a contract that Harry
has formed with a third party. Harry purchases a dump truck with
the assistance of the manufacturer-seller, but in the performance of
his sand-hauling contract, the brakes on the dump truck fail
causing Harry to crash. He is injured, his hauling equipment is
damaged, and he cannot perform his sand-hauling contract. What
are Harry's remedies against the manufacturer of the truck?
The Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA or "the Act") was
enacted to give stability and certainty to manufacturers by
imposing a standard by which products are to be judged.I The Act
sets forth "the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for
damage caused by their products," 2 which means that when the
elements of the Act are all met, a plaintiff may only pursue a claim
against a manufacturer under the four exclusive theories of liability
provided by the legislature.3 Yet, there is one exception to this
doctrine of exclusivity nestled in the definition of damage as set
forth by the Act. Damage under the LPLA allows a plaintiff to
pursue claims under "Chapter 9 of Title VII of Book III of the
Civil Code" for either economic loss or damage to the product
itself.4 In 1993, the legislature revised the "Sales" title of the Civil
Code, restructuring the warranty articles, and in doing so added
article 2524, "Thing
fit for ordinary use," into the chapter carved
5
out by the Act.
1.
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LA. L. REV. 565, 626 (1989) [hereinafter Kennedy, Primer].
2. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52 (2009).
3. Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corp., No. 04-3040, 2005 WL 2037419, at
*2 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005).
4. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009).

5. The LPLA originally carved out "Section 3 of Chapter 6 of Title VII of
Book III of the Civil Code, entitled 'Of Vices of Things Sold,"' but during the
"Sales" title revision the legislature revamped the articles on redhibition, giving
the concept its own chapter. The legislature added article 2524 to this newly
formed chapter. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009). See George L. Bilbe,
Redhibition and Implied Warranties Under the 1993 Revision of the Louisiana

Law of Sales, 54 LA. L. REV. 125, 125 (1993).
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Whether it was intentional or not, the addition of article 2524
to the newly entitled redhibition chapter may have broadened the
scope of the damage exception. This Comment explores the
question of whether the addition of article 2524 to the Louisiana
Civil Code redefines manufacturer liability by expanding the scope
of the LPLA's damage provision. Even if article 2524 is
interpreted as falling within the damage carve-out, another issue
may impede the imposition of liability upon a manufacturer:
specifically, whether redhibition subsumes article 2524. This
Comment explores the relationship between these warranties and
acknowledges that this inquiry will ultimately affect the viability
of article 2524 under the LPLA.
Section I of this Comment examines the LPLA and discusses
the redhibition carve-out under the damage provision. Section II
explores the addition of article 2524 to the redhibition chapter and
the differences between article 2524, redhibition, and the LPLA.
Section III addresses whether article 2524 is subsumed by the
exclusivity provision of the LPLA when the exclusivity language
of the Act applies. The Comment begins by examining the plain
language of the Act and the legislative history. Then, the Comment
focuses on Stroderdv. Yamaha Motor Company, which sets forth a
rule that is inconsistent with the plain language of the LPLA.
Finally, this Comment assesses a second issue raised by the
Stroderd court, which is the preemption of article 2524 by
redhibition when the claims arise out of the same characteristic of
the product.
I. THE LOUISIANA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT

The LPLA lays out "the exclusive theories of liability for
manufacturers for damage caused by their products." 6 In order to
bring a cause of action under the LPLA a plaintiff must prove: (1)
the defendant is a manufacturer of the product; (2) the damage
occasioned was proximately caused by a characteristic of the
product; (3) the damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of
the product; and (4) the characteristic made the product
unreasonably dangerous. 7 A product is only unreasonably
dangerous in construction, in composition, in design, due to an
inadequate warning, or because it does not conform to an express
6. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52 (2009).
7. Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 930 F. Supp. 241, 245 (E.D. La. 1996);
Bernard v. Ferrellgas, 689 So. 2d 554, 558 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997); Delery v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 643 So. 2d 807, 812-13 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994), writ
denied,648 So. 2d 393 (La. 1994).

2010]

COMMENT

617

warranty of the manufacturer about the product, as defined by the
Act.8 On its face, the LPLA is the exclusive vehicle for a party to
bring suit against a manufacturer for damage caused by its product,
and in order to have a viable claim under the Act, the product must
qualify as unreasonably dangerous in one of the four ways
provided. 9 Under this interpretation, Harry will only have a viable
claim against the manufacturer-seller if he can prove that the dump
truck was unreasonably dangerous in construction, in composition,
in design, due to an inadequate warning, or because it does not
conform to an express warranty of the manufacturer.
As a consequence, if Harry's claim does not fall into one of the
categories of unreasonably dangerous products set out under the
Act, he cannot recover. Variously, however, the exclusivity
language of the Act can be treated as a preamble, meaning that the
LPLA is only triggered if a product meets the unreasonably
dangerous requirement.' 0 The effect of this would be that in the
absence of an unreasonably dangerous product, the LPLA does not
govern, and the exclusivity language does not bar a suit afainst a
manufacturer that falls outside the parameters of the Act.' Under
these circumstances, Harry's actions against the manufacturer will
only be limited by the exclusivity language of the Act if the
manufacturer sold Harry a product that is unreasonably dangerous.
If this condition is not met, Harry has access to all the theories of
liability that would be unavailable against a non-manufacturing
seller. This Comment presupposes that an unreasonably dangerous
product is present, and as such the exclusivity language of the
LPLA will be triggered so that the greater issue of the effect of the
language can be explored. Thus, while the interpretation of the
Act's language is very important in determining when the LPLA's

8. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.54 (2009).
9. Ashley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 666 So. 2d 1320, 1321-22 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1996) ("The Louisiana Products Liability Act establishes the exclusive
theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products. A
claimant may not recover from a manufacturer for damages caused by a product
on the basis of any theory of recovery not set forth in the Act.").
10. John Neely Kennedy, The Dimension of Time in the LouisianaProducts
Liability Act, 42 LA. B.J. 15, 16 (1994) [hereinafter Kennedy, Dimension of
Time] ("These theories of liability are exclusive. They represent the four and
only ways a manufacturer can be liable in tort in cases in which the LPLA
controls.").
11. Interview with William Crawford, Dir., La. Law Inst., in Baton Rouge,
La. (Oct. 22, 2008). This is the suggested construction of the language by one of
the original drafters of the Act, William Crawford. Id.
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exclusivity language governs,' 2 this Comment presupposes that
this triggering event has occurred.
Historically, Louisiana's product liability law was not always
so narrowly drawn-general tort theories were available against
manufacturers for damage caused by their products.13 The LPLA
was a reaction to a line of Louisiana Supreme Court decisions that
"eliminated the requirement of proof of any particular
negligence." 14 In 1971, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Weber v.
Fidelity and Casualty Insurance Company of New York, adopted
an equivalent to "Restatement (Second) of Torts 5402A, the
fountainhead of strict product liability nationwide." However,
12. If Harry's claim for the harm caused by the product does not meet the
LPLA requirements, but Harry has a breach of contract or warranty claim
against the manufacturer, the latter interpretation would allow this claim to
stand. Policy reasons support the interpretation of the Act's provision as
imposing the exclusivity bar only when there is an "unreasonably dangerous"
product sold by the manufacturer. Specifically, it would be inequitable for
sellers who are similarly situated to have varying liabilities. For example,
allowing a plaintiff to sue a manufacturer in breach of contract when the product
is unfit is logical when we allow a non-manufacturing seller to be held liable in
such a case. There is no question that we would allow Harry to recover against
the seller if he was not the manufacturer of the product under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2524. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 (1996 & Supp. 2009). To not
allow Harry to recover against the manufacturer-seller is to hinge recovery on
the status of the seller as manufacturer of the product. This punishes nonmanufacturing sellers more stringently, which is counterintuitive since
manufacturers have greater control over the design and fitness of the product.
This inequity is exacerbated by the fact that both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing seller have knowledge of the buyer's intended use of the product,
as in Harry's case. As such, no distinction should be made between nonmanufacturing and manufacturing sellers, and, essentially, when a buyer has a
claim arising only out of the unfitness of a product it should be viable against
the manufacturer of the unfit product.
13. JOHN M. CHURCH, WILLIAM CORBETT, & TOM RICHARD, TORT LAW:
THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 635 (2007); FRANK L. MARAIST
& THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 15.02 (2d ed. 2009).
14. William Crawford, Faculty Symposium-Torts, 33 LA. L. REv. 206, 208
(1973). See also Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524, 526 (5th
Cir. 1995).
15. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, § 15.02. In Weber, the purchaser
of cattle dip brought suit against the manufacturer for the loss of seven cattle and
injuries to his sons, allegedly resulting from improper proportions of arsenic in
the product. Weber v. Fid. & Cas. Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754, 755-56 (La. 1971).
The court first stated that liability was contingent upon the plaintiff proving that
the product was "defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use, and that
the plaintiffs injuries were caused" by the defect. Id. at 755. In this case, the
applicable evidence was spoliated prior to the commencement of the trial, so the
bulk of the evidence presented by the plaintiff was his sons' testimonies. Id. at
756. The plaintiff buried the cattle and the dip immediately following the
incident, and by the trial in 1969 a highway was constructed over the burial site.
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Weber left unclear when strict liability was triggered and "the
proper test for determining whether a product was 'unreasonably
dangerous."" 6 The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed these
issues in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation.17 The
court's opinion assessed the admissibility of state-of-the-art
evidence in a strict product liability action, holding that when a
product is "unreasonably dangerous per se," the maker is liable
regardless of his ability to know of its danger.' 8 Immediately,
Halphen spurred legislative action aimed at ineffectuating this
"unreasonably dangerous per se" analysis before it could ever be
employed, resulting in the passage of the LPLA. 19 Generally, the
Act instituted the viability of the state-of-the-art defense, created
certainty in the standard upon which products are judged, and
implemented a prescriptive period of one year. 20 Moreover, the Act
employed exclusivity language affecting a claimant's access to
theories of liability against the manufacturer of a defective
product.2 1 As a consequence, negligence, Halphen's unreasonably
dangerous per se strict liability, and intentional tort are "casualties"
of the LPLA. 22 So, for example, the LPLA eliminated Harry's

Id. The court, however, imposed a presumption of knowledge of the vices in the
product upon the manufacturer, adding that when a product is "defective by
reason of its hazard to normal use" the plaintiff is alleviated of having to prove a
particular negligence by the maker. Id. at 755.
16. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, § 15.02.
17. Id. § 15.03; Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La.
1986). Halphen concerned a widow's wrongful death suit against an asbestos
manufacturer. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 112.
18. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 118; MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, §
15.03. The court's opinion used Weber as a foundation for employing pure strict
liability and reasoned that manufacturers are in a better position to bear the costs
of defective products than injured plaintiffs. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 118-19.
19. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, §§ 15.02-15.03; Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., The Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making Sense of It All, 49
LA. L. REv. 629, 630 (1989).
20. James M. Garner, The Louisiana 1988 Products Liability Reform Act:
The Changesand Their Effects, 5 TuL. Civ. L.F. 129, 160-61, 164 (1990).
21. Ashley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 666 So. 2d 1320, 1321-22 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1996).
22. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, §§ 15.04-15.05. It is imperative
to note that the effect of the Act is subject to the liability based on product
damage-not on a manufacturer's general liability for actions unrelated to its
products. Andrew D. Mendez & Justin P. Lemaire, LouisianaProductsLiability
Act: Is a Cause of Action Against a Product Manufacturerfor Negligent
Training Barred by the LPLA?, 54 LA. B.J. 182, 183-84 (2006) ("Another
argument why a negligent training claim would not fall under the LPLA (so as
to be beyond the scope of the Act's 'exclusive theories' provision) turns on the
second crucial element of an LPLA claim discussed above: an injury attributable
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access to a negligence claim against a manufacturer for damage
caused by a product. While Weber and Halphen demonstrate that
the LPLA grew out of a leislative reaction to the judicial
development of tort principles, the Act's exclusivity language
muddies whether some contract-based theories 24
are viable against a
manufacturer for damage caused by its product.
While the LPLA is couched in terms of exclusivity, it preserves
to some extent an action under redhibition. 25 Redhibition is a

to negligent training may not necessarily result from a defect or dangerous
condition of the product."). There has been much debate concerning the decision
by the legislature to streamline manufacturer liability in product cases. MARAIST
& GALLIGAN, supra note 13, §§ 15.04-15.05; Galligan, supra note 19, at 630;
Kennedy, Primer, sipra note 1, at 588-89. One of the drafters champions the
exclusivity provision's incorporation of the different theories of liability into the
four ways a maker is held liable under the Act. Kennedy, Primer,supra note 1,
at 588-90 ("Moreover, as will become apparent below, two of the four waysdefective design and inadequate warnings-are predicated on a negligence
standard. Another--defective construction or composition-sounds in strict
liability. The fourth-breach of express warranty-is rooted both in strict
liability and warranty principles. Consequently, negligence is still an integral
part of Louisiana products liability law, but it now exists as a component of the
LPLA cause of action rather than as an independent theory of liability.").
Critics, on the other hand, bemoan the elimination of negligence as an
independent theory of liability as "unusual," "counterintuitive," and a "radical
departure from national tort law and from prior Louisiana law." MARAIST &
GALLIGAN, supra note 13, § 15.05; Galligan, supra note 19, at 630.
23. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, §§ 15.02-15.03; Galligan, supra
note 19, at 630. The Comment will assert that the legislature's response was
really targeted at the Louisiana Supreme Court's pro-plaintiff approach to tort
law but not intended to affect a manufacturer's general contractual liability, with
the exception to this rule being express warranty, which was included in the
unreasonably dangerous product test under the Act. See infra Part II.C.
24. Prior to the Act a plaintiff could bring non-tort-based claims against a
manufacturer, namely based on contract-related theories. Redhibition is an
example of a contract-related theory that was available against manufacturers
prior to the enactment of the LPLA. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, §
15.02. See PPG Indus. v. Indus. Laminates Corp., 664 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1982);
Delta Refrigeration Co. v. Upjohn Co., 432 F. Supp. 124 (W.D. La. 1977);
Phillipe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310, 319 (La. 1981); Fox v. Am.
Steel Bldg. Co., 299 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). However, contract
claims against manufacturers were not limited to redhibition, where a claimant
could bring an action in warranty of fitness against manufacturers under article
2475. See Demars v. Natchitoches Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 353 So. 2d 433,
436-37 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Davis Co. v. Casso, 5 La. App. 565, *2 (La. Ct.
App. 1927).
25. Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corp., No. 04-3040, 2005 WL 2037419, at
*2 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005); Kennedy, Primer,supra note 1, at 580.
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seller's duty to warrant a product with hidden vices or defects.2 6
The dump truck's bad brakes in the original hypothetical are an
example of a hidden vice in the thing present at the time of sale,
giving rise to an action in redhibition against the manufacturerseller. This exception to the exclusivity mandate is found in the
damage provision of the definitions section. As per the Act, the
current definition of damage is read to include: "[D]amage to the
product itself and economic loss arising from a deficiency in or
loss of use of the product only to the extent that Chapter 9 of Title
VII of Book III of the Civil Code, entitled 'Redhibition,' does not
allow recovery for such damage or economic loss.27
A plain reading of this provision suggests that the legislature
intended to carve out an exception to the exclusivity provision by
specifically preserving Chapter 9 of Title VII of Book III of the
Civil Code. This provision is interpreted as preserving the article
on redhibition specifically. 28 Harry, then, can bring both an LPLA
claim and a redhibition claim against the manufacturer-seller of
the dump truck.
The language of the damage provision also suggests that the
recoverability of a buyer under the Act is contingent on the type of
damage occasioned. 2' Redhibition as a cause of action against a
manufacturer is not preserved in its entirety under the LPLA,
where a buyer's right of recovery exists only to the extent that it is

26.

LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. art. 2520 (1996 & Supp. 2009); MARAIST &

supra note 13, § 15.06. In order to qualify as redhibitory, the vice
must cause the product either to be "totally useless" or "so inconvenient" that
the buyer would not have purchased it, or at least would have paid a lesser price,
had he known of the defect. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
The Louisiana Civil Code requires that the defect exist at the time of, or within
three days of, delivery in order to have a viable claim for redhibition. LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 2530 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
27. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009).
28. For example, in Monk v. Scott Truck & Tractor, the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal found that the owner of a crane had a cause of action
against the manufacturer of the crane under article 2545 for redhibition and that
recovery was not precluded by the LPLA. 619 So. 2d 890, 893 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1993). In Draten v. Winn Dixie of Louisiana,Inc., the court in dicta stated that
the LPLA does not subsume a claim for redhibition, where the owner-seller of a
defective picnic bench sought to recover damages and attorneys' fees from the
manufacturer of the bench. 652 So. 2d 675, 678 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995).
29. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009). Contra Galligan, supra note
19, at 646 ("Both Professor Crawford and Mr. Kennedy suggest that the Act
governs claims for personal injury, while redhibition governs claims for
'economic' loss, a notion consistent with some American attitudes towards tort
and contract, but not mandated by a literal reading of either the redhibition
statutes or the Act.").
GALLIGAN,
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for either "damage to the product itself' or "economic loss." 30 The
rationale behind this language is that it "preserves the consumer's
right to sue the manufacturer in redhibition for recovery of
economic loss because, in most cases, economic loss will not be
'damage' under the LPLA.' ' 3 1 As a result, a plaintiff pursuing a
redhibition claim cannot demand damages for personal injury, and,
conversely, "economic loss" damages due to a redhibitory vice are
not available to a claimant under the Act. 32 If Harry brings both a
LPLA and redhibition claim, he will recover personal injury
damages under the LPLA claim and damages for "economic loss"
or "damage to the product itself' under his redhibition claim.
Thus, the LPLA damage provision provides an exception to the
exclusivity requirements, allowing a contractual action in
redhibition to exist to the extent of "economic loss" caused by a
product within the greater delictual framework of liability provided
against a manufacturer. 33 However, an issue arises upon closer
examination of the damage provision: articles dealing with
redhibition are not the only articles included in the plain language
30. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009); Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc.,
288 F.3d 239, 252 (5th Cir. 2002); De Atley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 876
So. 2d 112, 115 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2004). While the definition of "economic
loss" varies, "purely economic loss or damage may be defined generally as the
loss of the benefit of the user's bargain, that is, the loss of the service the
product was supposed to render, including loss consequent upon the failure of
the product to meet the level of performance expected of it in the consumer's
business." 63B Am. JUR. 2D ProductsLiability § 1909 (2008) ("Thus, 'economic
loss' refers to pecuniary damage for inadequate value, the cost of repair and
replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits, without any
claim of personal injury or damage to other property.").
31. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, § 15.06. A plaintiff can join
LPLA and redhibition claims and recover attorneys' fees for the portion
attributable to redhibition. Id. See also Kennedy, Primer, supra note 1, at 588
("Breach of implied warranty, or redhibition, is not also included in section
2800.54(B) as a way of proving that a product is unreasonably dangerous, which
means that redhibition is no longer available as a theory of liability when a
claimant seeks recovery for personal injury.").
32. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, § 15.06. A practical effect of this
distinction is that since attorneys' fees are unavailable under the Act, the joinder
of redhibition and LPLA claims will allow recovery for attorneys' fees only
insofar as those fees are related to the recovery of purely economic loss.
Kennedy, Primer,supra note 1, at 588. The provision's effects on the limitation
of attorneys' fees to redhibition claims for economic loss has been criticized
because it prohibits recovery by an injured buyer against a manufacturer whose
product harmed him physically, but it allows that same manufacturer to recover
attorneys' fees against another manufacturer whose product caused losses to the
first manufacturer's economy. Galligan, supra note 19, at 647.
33. SAUL LITVLNOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 16.19, in 6 LoUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 534 (2d ed. 2001).
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of the Act. As stated previously, the entirety of "Chapter 9 of Title
VII of Book III of the Civil Code, entitled 'Redhibition"' is carved
out in the Act.3 4 Stated another way, the redhibition chapter of the
Civil Code does not solely pertain to redhibition, but also
comprises breach of contract articles governed by the rules of
conventional obligations. 35 This distinction is important because it
affects the availability 36of attorneys' fees and the prescriptive
period for filing a claim.
II. LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 2524 WARRANTY OF FITNESS

Louisiana Civil Code article 2524 is an example of a breach of
contract claim in the Redhibition Chapter carve-out of the LPLA.37
Article 2524, or warranty of fitness, embodies the concept that the
seller warrants that the good is "fit for the particular purpose for
The Louisiana Supreme Court first
which it was bought."
recognized the warranty in Fee v. Sentell,39 and in 1993 the
legislature added article 2524
40 to the Civil Code during a full-scale
articles.
sales
the
of
revision
Article 2524, titled "Thing fit for ordinary use," reads as
follows:

34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009).
35. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520-2548 (1996 & Supp.
2009). See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. b (1996); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2529 cmts. a, f(1996).
36. See infra Part II.
37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524
(1996 & Supp. 2009).
38. The content of current article 2524 first existed (and continues to exist) in
the second sentence of article 2475, which states that "the seller also warrants that
the thing sold is fit for its intended use." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2475 (1996 &
Supp. 2009); 1993 La. Acts. No. 841. The current version of article 2475 cross
references article 2524 in comment (b), noting that "intended use" can be
presumed to mean "ordinary use" in situations absent seller's knowledge of
buyer's intent. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2475 cmt. b (1996). Thus, the warranty of
fitness principle was firmly established in Louisiana jurisprudence and the Civil
Code prior to the enactment of article 2524. 1993 La. Acts. No. 841.
39. 28 So. 279 (La. 1900); 1993 La. Acts. No. 841.
40. J. Peter Kovata, The Revision of the LouisianaCivil Code Sales Title: In
Many Ways a Non-Event, 40 LoY. L. REv. 139, 139 (1994). See 1993 La. Acts
No. 841, which amended and reenacted Title VII, "Of Sale," of Book III of the
Civil Code. The LPLA originally carved out "Section 3 of Chapter 6 of Title VII
of Book III of the Civil Code, entitled 'Of Vices of Things Sold,"' but during
the revision the legislature revamped the articles on redhibition, giving the
concept its own chapter. The legislature added article 2524 to this newly formed
chapter. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009); Bilbe, supra note 5, at 125.
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The thing sold must be reasonably fit for its ordinary use.
When the seller has reason to know the particular use the
buyer intends for the thing, or the buyer's particular
purpose for buying the thing, and that the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting it, the thing
sold must be fit for the buyer's intended use or for his
particular purpose.
If the thing is not so fit, the buyer's rights are
4 governed by
the general rules of conventional obligations. '
The first and second sentences of the article are interpreted
disjunctively, giving rise to two scenarios under which an article
2524 action may arise. The first scenario is one in which a
presumption arises that the buyer intends "to put the thing to its
42
ordinary use," and the product cannot meet this expectation.
Imagine that Harry did not tell the manufacturer-seller of the dump
truck why he wanted to purchase the truck. Without working
brakes, Harry's truck is unfit for its ordinary use of hauling and
transporting material because it cannot be driven and thus falls
under the first sentence contemplated in this article. The second
sentence involves a situation where the seller, without giving the
buyer an express warranty, knows of the buyer's intended purpose,
and in some situations aided the buyer in the selection of the thing,
but the thing does not conform to the buyer's intent. 43 This
situation conforms to the original Harry hypothetical, where he
expressly articulated to the manufacturer-seller his intent to haul
sand. The third sentence applies to both the first and second
sentences, conferring contractual
remedies upon a plaintiff who
44
purchases an unfit product.
The comments to article 2524 state that it is governed by the
general rules of obligations.45 This is important because of its
effects on the parties. The first effect deals with prescription,
which is "the running of time during which rights are created or
extinguished. ' 4 6 Redhibition is subject to a prescriptive period of
either four years from delivery or one year from discovery of the
defect. 47 Claims under the LPLA are also governed by a
41. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
42. Id.cmt. d.
43. Id; Bilbe, supra note 5, at 142.
44. Bilbe, supranote 5, at 138.
45. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. b (1996).
46. Vivica Pierre, What Do Farmers Impliedly Warrant When They Sell
Their Livestock: A Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Louisiana
Civil Code, and the Vienna Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale
of Goods, 19 S.U. L. REv. 357, 375 (1992).
47. Bilbe, supra note 5, at 133.
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prescriptive period of one year. 48 Article 2524, conversely, falls
under article 3499's ten-year prescriptive period.49 Thus, if Harry
is deemed as having viable redhibition, LPLA, and article 2524
breach of contract claims, he will have considerably more time to
bring an action under warranty of fitness than for a redhibition or
LPLA claim.
The second effect arises with a buyer's remedies. In most
cases, when the seller breaches his article 2524 obligation, the
buyer may seek damages and dissolution of the sale, a broader
remedy than the one provided under redhibition. 50 Thus, buyers are
incentivized to pursue a fitness claim over a claim for redhibition
when both exist. However, this incentive does not arise in the
case of the manufacturer, who is charged with presumptive
knowledge under article 2545.52 In situations of actual--or as with
manufacturers-presumed bad faith, the legislature allows the
recovery of damages and attorneys' fees by the buyer. 53 Attorneys'
fees are not available for claimants pursuing causes of action for
warranty of fitness. 54 Since the manufacturer-seller of the dump
trucks is deemed a bad faith seller, Harry will not necessarily be
getting a greater recovery under article 2524 than he would under
redhibition since attorneys' fees are available for the latter. Thus,
the significance of including article 2524 in the LPLA's
exclusivity exception lies in the prescriptive periods available to
plaintiffs but not as much in the availability of a superior remedy.
III. DOES THE LPLA SUBSUME ARTICLE 2524?
In order to determine whether the LPLA preempts a breach of
contract claim under article 2524, it is necessary to look at several
factors. First, it is necessary to begin with the plain language of the
statute and apply methods of interpretation to extract the legislative
intent. Next, this Comment will examine the legislative history of
48. Kennedy, Dimension of Time, supra note 10, at 16.
49. Morris & Dickson Co. v. Jones Bros. Co., 691 So. 2d 882, 890 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1997); Bilbe, supra note 5, at 144.
50. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2541 (1996 & Supp. 2009) (rescission of sale
only available under certain circumstances); Bilbe, supra note 5, at 140-41.
51. Bilbe, supra note 5, at 141.
52. Id. at 130-31; LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
Another effect of the bad faith presumption imposed upon manufacturers who
sell products with redhibitory defects is that they are "in no circumstances
entitled to the repair opportunity afforded vendors" who were in good faith.
Bilbe, supra note 5, at 132-33.
53. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (1996 & Supp. 2009); Bilbe, supra note
5, at 140-41.
54. Bilbe, supra note 5, at 141.

626

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

both the Act and the addition of article 2524 to the redhibition
chapter, which aids the determination of whether the legislature
later intended this addition to affect the scope of the Act. Finally,
this Comment will address Stroderd's holding that article 2524 is
preempted by the LPLA and, alternatively, by redhibition.
A. The PlainLanguage and an ExegeticalAnalysis of the Damage
Provision
The LPLA provides that "[a] claimant may not recover from a
manufacturer for damage caused by a product on the basis of any
theory of liability that is not set forth in this Chapter., 55 It also
states:
"Damage" includes damage to the product itself and
economic loss arising from a deficiency in or loss of use of
the product only to the extent that Chapter 9 of Title VII of
Book III of the Civil Code, entitled "Redhibition," 56does not
allow recovery for such damage or economic loss.
Thus, the plain language of the Act establishes several things.
First, it sets out the exclusive grounds of liability for a
manufacturer for damage caused by its products. Second, it
provides an exception to the exclusivity of the Act, which includes
those actions brought under "Chapter 9 of Title VII of Book III of
the Civil Code." Finally, the plain language limits the type of
damage recoverable under the redhibition chapter exception to
either "damage to the product itself' or "economic loss arising
from a deficiency in or loss of use of the product." 57 As to the
second conclusion, there are three actions under the redhibition
chapter that are potential candidates for the imposition of liability
upon a manufacturer: (1) an action under article 2520 for
"Warranty against redhibitory defects"; (2) an action under article
2524 for "Thing fit for ordinary use"; and (3) an action under
article 2529 for "Thing not of the kind specified in the contract."
The focus of this Comment is on article 2524 because an action in
redhibition is already recognized as a viable exception to the
exclusivity mandate of the LPLA. Moreover, the Act incorporated
a provision imposing liability upon a manufacturer who expressly
55. LA. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 9:2800.52 (2009).

56. Id. §9:2800.53.
57. Id. Emphasis of the type of recoverable damage is important since any

theory of recovery falling under the exception will be limited to economic
damages and personal injury damages under any actions arising from the chapter
will not be recoverable. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 13, § 15.06;
Kennedy, Primer,supra note 1, at 588.
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warrants its products and thus provides a remedy under the Act for
a buyer who would be tempted to bring an article 2529 action for
breach of express warranty. 58 Since article 2524 is located in
Chapter 9 of Title VII of Book III of the Civil Code, it falls under
the exception in the damage provision according to the plain
language of the Act. As a consequence, when the LPLA's requisite
elements have been met, a plaintiff should be able to sue a
manufacturer under article 2524 to recover losses from either
"damage to the product itself' or economic loss arising therefrom,
59
thus escaping the general exclusivity provision of the Act.
58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.58 (2009) ("Unreasonably dangerous

because of nonconformity to express warranty; A product is unreasonably
dangerous when it does not conform to an express warranty made at any time by
the manufacturer about the product if the express warranty has induced the
claimant or another person or entity to use the product and the claimant's
damage was proximately caused because the express warranty was untrue.").
See discussion infra Part III.C.
59. There are two instances where it is prudent to move past the plain
language in search of an alternative meaning than the one provided. KENNETH
M. MURCHISON & J.-R. TRAHAN, WESTERN LEGAL TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS:
LOUISIANA IMPACT 159, 162-63 (rev. ed. 2003). Interpretation may commence

if there is a manifest error in redaction or clerical error. Id.It may be possible to
apply the manifest error exception to the plain language of the LPLA. The
legislature may have intended that "Damage" in the Act include "damage...
only to the extent that article 2520, entitled 'Warranty against redhibitory
defects,' does not allow [such] recovery." Cf LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53
(2009). When first enacted, the LPLA's "Damage" provision did not refer to
"Chapter 9 of Title VII of Book III of the Civil Code" but instead referred to
"Section 3 of Chapter 6 of Title VII of Book III of the Civil Code, entitled 'Of
the Vices of the Thing Sold,"' which only pertained to redhibition since it was
prior to the revision of the "Sales" title and the addition of article 2524. William
Crawford, New Louisiana Products Liability Act Effective September 1, 1988
(Nov. 18, 1988), in THE NEW PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER
1, 1988, Nov. 18-19, at 4-6 [hereinafter Crawford, New LPLA]. See generally
"Section 3 of Chapter 6 of Title VII of Book III of the Civil Code, entitled 'Of
the Vices of the Thing Sold,"' of the Louisiana Civil Code (1992). As a
consequence, when the legislators originally drafted the exception to the LPLA,
warranty of fitness did not fall within the scope of the carve-out, and article
2524 did not exist yet, so the language in hindsight may have mistakenly been
drafted to be overbroad. See infra Part III.B. However, it begs the question of
whether it is appropriate to move past the plain language of the Act-to use
evidence of potential legislative intent to determine whether we can move
beyond the text to determine the legislature's intent.
It is justifiable to move beyond the plain language of legislation,
alternatively, when its application leads to a social insufficiency. MURCHISON &
TRAHAN, supra note 59, at 162-63. In this instance, a manufacturer may argue
that allowing the additional breach of contract claim to fall under the "Damage"
exception is unjust in that it exposes them to a liability that is greater than
originally existed under the Act. Since this does not delve into the intent of the
legislature, but deals solely with the effects of subsequent legislative provisions
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An exegetical analysis of the text, specifically the application
of the interpretation technique of ab inutilitate, supports the
conclusion that the legislature intended to draft the article to read
"Chapter 9 of Title VII of Book III of the Civil Code,"
incorporating all the articles in the chapter rather than only to
include article 2520, entitled "Redhibition." 60 It is presumed that
the legislature uses language economically, and as such
interpretations that render words or phrases superfluous or
redundant should be avoided. 61 Thus, to read the clause as
including only one article within the chapter is incompatible with
how legislation is traditionally read. Further, there is a general rule
of civilian interpretation commanding that statutes be interpreted
strictly because they derogate from the Civil Code. 62 Applying this
rule to the damage provision would dictate that it is inappropriate
to read in a narrower provision than is facially apparent. Finally,
reading article 2524 in pari materia with the LPLA does not
detract from the conclusion that article 2524 should be included as
a viable cause of action against a manufacturer since nothing in the
article provides evidence that it is not intended to be included in
the carve-out. 6 3 While the plain language and text of the article
seem to support the inclusion of article 2524 in the Act's
exception, it may be necessary to move beyond the text and
explore the history of the Act and the article to discern the
legislature's intent.
B. A Historicaland Teleological Analysis: In Search of the
Legislative Intent
There are two stages in the legislative history that need to be
addressed in attempting to discern whether it was the intent of the
legislature to incorporate article 2524 into the exception provided

on the Act, proceeding past the language of the text is appropriate to determine
the intent of the legislature.
60. Ab inutilitate is a "time-honored 'maxim' of civilian interpretation,
which means "argument from superfluity." MURCHISON & TRAHAN, supra note
59, at 168, 171.
61. Id.at 171.
62. "Special dispositions derogate from general dispositions (specialia
generalibusderogant)." Id.at 168. "Exceptions are strictly interpreted (exceptio
est strictissimae interpretationis)."Id.at 169.
63. In pari materia is a method of interpretation where "[o]ne may interpret
a given statutory provision in light of other statutory provisions that address the
same subject matter," and it is translated to mean "argument from context." Id.
at 172-73. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 13 (1999 & Supp. 2009).
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by the definition of damage. The first stage is the legislative
development of the LPLA. The second stage is the revision of the
"Sales" articles, specifically the incorporation of article 2524 into
the redhibition chapter. In each stage it is necessary to determine
whether the legislature intended article 2524 to be preserved by the
redhibition chapter exception to the exclusivity language of the
LPLA.
At first blush, the circumstances contemporary with the
enactment of the LPLA suggest that the original intent of the
drafters was not to protect an action for warranty of fitness. The
legal climate in which the Act arose involved legislative hostility
to the pro-plaintiff approach taken by the courts in recovery against
manufacturers. 64 As a consequence it would be inconsistent to
interpret article 2524 as being exempt from the Act's exclusivity
provisions since broadening the scope of liability of manufacturers
is counter to the trend established by the legislature following
Halphen.6 5
However, the aim of the drafters was not entirely promanufacturer, as evidenced by the coalition of parties who
negotiated the Act, including the Louisiana Association of
Business and Industrg (LABI) and the Louisiana Trial Lawyers
Association (LTLA). LABI, a pro-business organization, wanted
to rein in the new liberalism developed under the Halphen
doctrine, replacing it with a strictly construed statute that would
67
ensure predictability and lead to lower insurance premiums.
Conversely, LTLA, an organization comprised of primarily
plaintiffs attorneys, wanted to maintain the gains achieved under
Halphen, proposing the enactment of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. As one of the principal drafters suggests, the Act was
"intended to strike an equitable balance between the right of a
claimant who is injured in a product-related accident to just
compensation and the right of the product's manufacturer to be
judged fairly," while adding "clarity, precision[,] and certainty" to
the field of products liability.69 Also undercutting the argument
that the drafting of the Act was in a completely pro-manufacturer
climate was the failure of an earlier version of the Act requiring
that the plaintiff prove noncompliance by the manufacturer with
64. MARAIST& GALLIGAN, supra note 13, §§ 15.02-15.03.
65. Id.
66. Galligan, supra note 19, at 634.
67. Id.
68. Id, The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A is credited with
promoting the implementation of strict product liability. MARAIST & GALLIGAN,
supra note 13, § 15.02.
69. Kennedy, Primer,supra note 1, at 626.
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the state-of-the-art,
a heavy burden on a party less equipped to
70
carry it.
An examination of the legislative reaction to Halphen further
supports the contention that the legislative intent behind the Act
includes preserving a warranty of fitness action. Halphen dealt
with the expansion of tort liability, specifically the application of
strict liability and the removal of the state-of-the-art defense. 7 The
legislative backlash after Halphen was aimed particularly at the
Louisiana Supreme Court's pro-plaintiff construction of tort law
72
but was not aimed at a plaintiffs breach of contract remedies.
The United States Eastern District Court in In re Ford stated that a
plaintiff's claim for fraud is not subsumed by the LPLA since the
Act's "preemptive force. . . extends to claims based on tort duties"
and thus does not "bar redhibition actions ... based on warranty
theories. '73 This decision recognizes that the LPLA was designed
to deal with tort liability-claims based on warranty principals are
not barred. Moreover, in drafting the LPLA, the legislature
reserved the cause of action in redhibition and created two avenues
of liability for a manufacturer: one for its tortious conduct and one
for its contractual liability. 74 These avenues are defined by the
limitations on a plaintiffs recovery under each avenue, where the
LPLA reserves "economic loss" for redhibition and personal injury
for the Act.7 5 Furthermore, the Act states that the conduct resulting
in liability constitutes "'fault' within the meaning of Civil Code
Article 2315," and the cross references in the Civil Code are all to
tort-based articles, such as articles 2315 and 2317.76 These factors
support a finding that the aim of the Act was to curb the tort
liability of manufacturers but was not necessarily intended to affect
a plaintiffs ability to bring a claim in contract-particularly an
article 2524 breach of contract claim. But this conclusion is
undermined by two factors: the original comments to the Act and
the existence of article 2475 at the time of the LPLA's enactment.
The original comments to the Act seem to obliterate any
suggestion that the legislature intended to reserve a warranty of

70. Galligan, supra note 19, at 637.
71. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
72. Cf Kennedy, Dimension of Time, supra note 10, at 16 ("These theories
of liability are exclusive. They represent the four and only ways a manufacturer
can be liable in tort in cases in which the LPLA controls.").
73. In re Ford Motor Co. Vehicle Paint Litig., No. MDL 1063, 1996 WL
426548, at *16 n.3 (E.D. La. July 30, 1996).
74. LrrVINOFF, supra note 33, at 534.
75. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009).
76. See id.§ 9:2800.52.
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fitness claim at the time of the enactment of the LPLA.77 One
comment stated that "[b]reach of implied warranties, both of
merchantability of a product and of its fitness for its intended
purpose, are eliminated as separate causes of action, but are within
the scope of the cause of action provided by this Chapter.' 78 Instead,
the drafter's comment contends that the implied warranty causes of
action, including warranty of fitness, are preserved in the Act.79
Upon closer examination, however, this assertion is not directly
supported. To qualify under the Act, the damage must have been
caused by an unreasonably dangerous product. A product can be
unreasonably dangerous in four ways: in construction and
composition, in design, due to an inadequate warning, or because it
does not conform to an express warranty. 81 The only category that
is "rooted . . . in . . . warranty principles" is the last categoryfailure to conform to an express warranty. 82 The Act defines
"[e]xpress warranty" as "a representation, statement of alleged fact
or promise about a product or its nature, material, or workmanship
that represents, affirms or promises that the product or its nature,
material or workmanship possesses specified characteristics or
qualities or will meet a specified level of performance." 83 "Implied
warranties," like article 2524, are categorically excluded by their
nature because they apply in situations where there was no
communication by the vendor to the vendee of the quality of the
thing. 4 Instead, the warranty arises from the average consumer's
expectation or the buyer's express purpose as communicated to the
seller.85 Thus, on the one hand, the original comments are evidence
that the legislature did not intend to carve out article 2524 when it
drafted the LPLA. However, on the other, article 2524 does not fall
within the theories of liability provided by the Act, which is the
reason the comments claim the warranty is no longer an
independent claim for recovery.
A second factor undermining the argument that the legislature
drafted the LPLA to address only tort liability of manufacturers is
that warranty of fitness as a cause of action existed under article
2475 prior to the legislative addition of article 2524 to the Civil

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Crawford, New LPLA, supra note 59, at 1.
Id.
Id.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.54 (2009).
Id.
Kennedy, Primer,supra note 1, at 588.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009).
LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. d (1996).
LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2524 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
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Code. 6 As such, the legislature could have provided specific
provisions carving out the article. Instead, the only exception
provided was for "Section 3 of Chapter 6 of Title VII of Book III
of the Civil Code, entitled 'Of the Vices of the Thing Sold,"'
which did not include article 2475, the Code basis for warranty of
fitness at that time.8 7 On the other hand, the drafters of the LPLA
did incorporate express warranty into the Act 88 as one of the ways
a product is unreasonably dangerous.8 9 This suggests that the
drafters of the LPLA were cognizant of the Act's potential effect
on warranty and liability in contract. Reasoning a contrario, it
follows that by the inclusion of the express warranty, the absence
of the breach of an implied warranty is not intended to be
recoverable against a manufacturer. 90
While the impetus of the Act was principally motivated to
overrule pro-plaintiff decisions like Halphen, pro-plaintiff
attorneys played a role in drafting the LPLA. Thus, construing the
interpretation of the damage provision to comport with the plain
language of the Act is consistent to some extent with the
circumstances contemporary with enactment, even though it will
expand manufacturers' liability by subjecting them to a breach of
contract claim under article 2524. Furthermore, while it is unclear
whether the original intent of the drafters was to remove the cause
of action for warranty of fitness from plaintiffs in suits against
manufacturers, evidence suggests that the Act only purposefully
preserved redhibition and express warranty.
While the legislative intent concurrent with the enactment of
the LPLA does not support the inclusion of article 2524 in the
LPLA's damage exception, a later legislative act may affect
whether article 2524 is included in the carve-out. Following the
enactment of the LPLA, the sales portion of the Louisiana Civil
Code underwent a revision in 1993, which included the addition of
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2475 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
87. William Crawford, New LPLA, supra note 59, at 3-7. This is the pre"Sales" revision version of the damage provision. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.53 (2009).
88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.54 (2009). However, it should be noted
that the express warranty that is provided in the Act is sui generis. The main
deviance from the Civil Code warranty is that it can be relied upon by third
persons not a party to the sale. Interview with William Crawford, supra note 11.
86.

89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.58 (2009).

90. Touro Infirmary v. Sizeler Architects, 947 So. 2d 740, 745 (La. App.
4th Cir. 2006). A contrario is a civilian interpretation technique, namely
"argument by contrast." MURCHISON & TRAHAN, supra note 59, at 168, 169
("Where a statutory provision lays down a rule for x, one can infer, at least
under some circumstances, that every non-x is subject to an opposing rule.").
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article 2524 into the newly formed redhibition chapter.9' There is
little doctrine on why the Louisiana State Law Institute added
article 2524 to the redhibition chapter, and the portion of the bill
discussing the implemented changes to the "Sales" title does not
mention any intent to change the interpretation of the scope of the
LPLA. 92 In fact, the comments state that while the addition is new,
the article does not change the law. 93 However, the absence of
express language suggesting a change in the law is not dispositive
since Louisiana Civil Code article 8 provides for implied repeals of
part of a law.94 The addition of article 2524 into the chapter
dealing with redhibition may function as an implied repeal by
expanding the exception of the LPLA's exclusivity mandate.
A similar argument was attempted in Pipitone v. Biomatrix,
Inc., but was ultimately unsuccessful. 95 A plaintiff who contracted
a knee infection following the injection of manufactured96
replacement synovial fluid sued the maker of the synthetic fluid.
The plaintiff argued that the reenactment of the redhibition articles
impliedly repealed the portions of the LPLA, which the courts
have interpreted as limiting recovery of redhibition under the Act
to "economic loss." 97 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected

this argument, citing the strong presumption against implied
repeals in Louisiana, stating that the "re-enactment of the
redhibition articles did nothing to change the LPLA's definition of
91. Bilbe, supranote 5, at 125.
92. 1993 La. Acts. No. 841. "V. Redhibition" of the bill gives the history of
the warranty of fitness at common law and states that the courts in Louisiana
have interpreted redhibition as including warranty of fitness, but little substance
on the new article is given. Id. With regard to the article specifically, the bill
references the comment's articulation of the appropriate remedy under the
article as one in contract. Id.
93. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a (1996). Upon closer examination,
it is evident that the article does affect a change in the law in the realm of good
faith. Bilbe, supra note 5, at 140-44 ("Turning to the revision's warranty
provisions, it is once more noted that the Law Institute disclaims any intention
of changing the law through the enactment of a warranty of reasonable fitness
for ordinary use. In the case of good faith sellers of defective items, however, a
change in the law appears unavoidable .... Thus, the revision may well afford
an alternative more lucrative than an action in redhibition in every instance
where items are affected by redhibitory defects." (citations omitted)).
94. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 8 (1999 & Supp. 2009) ("Laws are repealed,
either entirely or partially, by other laws. A repeal may be express or implied. It
is express when it is literally declared by a subsequent law. It is implied when
the new law contains provisions that are contrary to, or irreconcilable with, those
of the former law. The repeal of a repealing law does not revive the first law.").
95. 288 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2002).
96. Id. at 241-42.
97. Id. at 250. Plaintiffs argued that the implied repeal resurrected redhibition
as a full alternative theory of liability against a manufacturer. Id. at 251.
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'damage,"' and noting that limiting the remedy for redhibition to
"economic loss" harmonizes the two statutes, as required by
Louisiana Civil Code article 13.98
Pipitone is distinguishable from this analysis. In Pipitone, the
plaintiff argued that the mere reenactment of the title containing
the redhibition articles functioned as an implied repeal. 99 The
plaintiffs argument for the repeal was based on a general action
taken by the legislature during the overhaul of the "Sales" title, and
the court stated that the reenactment did not change the Act's
definition of "Damage."' 00 It would be illogical to allow repeal
based on mere reenactment when no content change was instituted.
The legislature's treatment of article 2524 is different. Specifically,
the legislature took an affirmative and specific step in adding
article 2524 to the redhibition chapter. The article was not just a
consequence of the structural adjustment, but an injection of new,
specific content into the chapter.
Moreover, the addition of article 2524 is further distinguishable
from Pipitone because it does not cause discord with the plain
language of the Act. In Pipitone, the court correctly reasoned that
limiting recovery to "economic loss" harmonized the LPLA and
article 2520101 because the LPLA expressly limits recovery under
the redhibition chapter to "economic loss" or "damage to the
product itself."'10 2 Thus, the court's interpretation of this statute
accords with the plain language of the Act. To construe the
language according to the plaintiffs interpretation in Pipitone and
allow the reenactment to replace this express limitation language
with old redhibition principles would allow expanded recovery,
rendering the plain language of the Act derelict and the statutes in
disharmony. However, reading article 2524 as included in the
Act's damage provision does not ineffectuate any provision of the
LPLA. To the contrary, it reinforces the plain language of the Act,
which carves out the entire chapter of which article 2524 is a part.
Finally, in Pipitone, the court noted that there is a presumption
against implied repeals in Louisiana.' 0 3 This presumption is "based
on the theory that the legislature envisions the whole body of law
when it enacts new legislation," and as such "a court should give
harmonious effect to all acts on a subject when reasonably
possible. ' 1°4 Pipitone's analysis supports the incorporation of
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 251.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 251.
Id.
102. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (2009).
103. Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 251.
104. State v. Piazza, 596 So. 2d 817, 819 (La. 1992).
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article 2524 into the definition of damage because it endorses the
presumption that the legislature was aware of the scope of the
existing damage provision when they added the article. Since the
construction of article 2524 as a part of the Act's carve-out
harmonizes the two statutes, the presumption may be overcome.
It is possible that the addition of article 2524 to the chapter
carved out by the LPLA functions as an implied repeal by
broadening the scope of the damage provision. An implied repeal
requires that the inconsistencies of two legislative acts be so great
that they mutually exclude one another. 10 5 The legislature's
addition of article 2524 to the redhibition chapter is an act that is
irreconcilable with the original construction of the damage
provision as encompassing only redhibition. Even if the addition of
article 2524 does not rise to the level of an implied repeal, it does
undermine the a contrario argument regarding article 2529 on
express warranty. 0 6 While the original incorporation of express
warranty into the LPLA indicated a legislative intent to purposely
exclude a cause of action for warranty of fitness, the addition of
article 2524 during the revision undermines this argument. Now,
each warranty is viable against a manufacturer under the plain
language of the Act. Thus, whether the legislature intended to
make a change in the law by adding article 2524 to the redhibition
chapter is unclear. It may be beneficial to interpret the addition of
warranty of fitness to the chapter preserved by the LPLA as
impliedly repealing the original scope of the exception so as to
harmonize the legislative acts and bring accord to the plain
language of the Act.
C. Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corporation
Cases have emerged since the "Sales" title revision that limit
the scope of the damage exception to the LPLA's exclusivity
language to only the article on redhibition, rather than the entire
chapter. 10 7 The principal case addressing the issue is Stroderd, in
which the plaintiffs sued a manufacturer of motorcycles under
redhibition, article 2524, negligence, and the LPLA due to a recall
on the bikes for transmission failure. 10 8 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the
105. Id. The test for implied repeal is that it only applies when two legislative
acts are "irreconcilable" so that they cannot operate concurrently. Id.
106. See supra Part III.B.
107. Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corp., No. 04-3040, 2005 WL 2037419
(E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005); In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 792,
800 (E.D. La. 1998); Jefferson v. Lead Indus., 930 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. La. 1996).
108. Stroderd,2005 WL 2037419, at *1.
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manufacturer's motion to dismiss for two reasons. 10 9 First, it held
that the LPLA and the "Louisiana redhibition law [are] the sole
vehicles for suit against a manufacturer for damages arising from a
defective product."' 10 Furthermore, it held that even if the breach
of contract claim was not subsumed by the LPLA, it is subsumed
by redhibition. 1'1
To support the conclusion that the LPLA preempts a cause of
action for warranty of fitness, the court cited the plain language
and legislative history of the Act.' 12 In discussing the plain
language, the court committed a logical fallacy by manipulating
the language of the carve-out so as to support its ultimate
conclusion. The court stated that "'Damage' is defined as 'damage
to the product itself and economic loss arising from a deficiency in
or loss of use of the product only to the extent that [a redhibition
cause of action] does not allow recovery for such damage or
economic loss.' 1 13 Thus, the court bracketed out "Chapter 9 of
Title VII of Book III of the Civil Code," which would support the
proposition argued by the plaintiff that the warranty of fitness
cause of action is an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the
Act, and replaced it with the language "[a redhibition cause of
action]," which supports its own position that the Act's exception
only applies to the redhibition article.
The Stroderd opinion next cited the legislative history as
evidence of the drafters' intent to "make the Act and Louisiana
redhibition law the sole vehicles for a suit against a manufacturer
for damages arising from a defective product." 114 The legislative
history does not give a clear or singular legislative intent but
15
instead reveals a coalition of parties asserting various interests.'
Furthermore, Stroderd only addressed the legislative history
concurrent with the enactment of the LPLA and did not consider
the subsequent effects of the "Sales" title revision upon the Act. l6
Moreover, the court utilized a series of cases to support its
proposition, but each is problematic. For example, the court cited
In re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation, which also bracketed
109. Id.at *2.
110. Id. The court based this conclusion on the plain language and legislative
history of the Act. Id.
I111.

Id. at "3.

112. Id. at *2.
113. Id. (emphasis added) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.5800.53 (2009)).
Note that the bracketed language is the court's. See also In re Air Bag Prods.
Liab. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 792, 800 (E.D. La. 1998).
114. Stroderd, 2005 WL 2037419, at *2.
115.

See supra Part III.B.

116. Id.
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out the necessary language, and Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company, which did not discuss the issue at hand but instead
concerned whether the LPLA is retroactive.117 The opinion also
cited Jefferson v. Lead Industries Association for the proposition
that "plaintiffs
allegations
of negligence,
fraud by
misrepresentation, market share liability, breach of implied
warranty of fitness and civil conspiracy fail to state a claim against
the lead paint pigment manufacturers under the LPLA and must
therefore be dismissed."' "18 However, Jefferson reached the
generalization that breach of implied warranty of fitness is
preempted by the Act on the basis of cases dealing with tort
theories of liability.1 19 Jefferson also cited the limitation of
recovery under redhibition to "economic loss" as support for
dismissing the plaintiff's various claims, which included an
implied warranty of fitness claim. 120 The "economic loss"
limitation on redhibition, though, arises out of the language in the
definition of damage and is not only subject to redhibition, but
rather to the entire chapter.' 2' This undercuts the proposition that
article 2524 should not be viable since it was added during the
1993 "Sales" title revision and thus falls under the "economic loss"
limitation of the LPLA. Thus, Stroderd's first holding that the
plain language, legislative history, and case law support the
conclusion that the LPLA preempts article 2524 is clearly
erroneous. To the contrary, the plain language undermines the
court's assertion, the legislative history is bare, and the case law is
easily distinguished.
117. Stroderd, 2005 WL 2037419, at *2; In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Litig., 7
F. Supp. 2d at 800 (In re Air cited Vincent v. Timesh, No. 98-0621, 1998 WL
231036, at *2 (E.D. La. May 7, 1998), which dealt with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim where the plaintiff was unable to prove that seller was a
manufacturer under the LPLA. The court in Vincent did not address the scope of
the "damage" or the exclusivity provisions of the LPLA. Id.); Brown v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1995).
118. 930 F. Supp. 241,245 (E.D. La. 1996).
119. For example, it references Automatique New Orleans v. U-Haul SelectIt, Inc., which deals with negligence, and Hopkins v. NCR Corporation,which
speaks to strict liability. Jefferson, 930 F. Supp. at 245; Automatique New
Orleans v. U-Select-It, Inc., No. 94-3179, 1995 WL 491151, at *4 (E.D. La.
Aug. 15, 1995); Hopkins v. NCR Corp., Inc., No. 93-188-B-M2, 1994 WL
757510, at *2-3 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 1994). The legislative history reveals a
clear intent to limit the availability of tort remedies against manufacturers since
the LPLA was in response to the plaintiff-friendly recoveries allocated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court. See supra Part I.A. Whether there was a legislative
intent to affect contract law is unclear, so extending cases discussing the demise
of theories of liability based on tort is not appropriate. See supra Part I.A.
120. Jefferson, 930 F. Supp. at 245.
121. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2800.53 (2009).
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The Stroderd opinion challenges the plaintiffs breach of
warranty action for the independent reason that an article 2524
claim is subsumed by redhibition law. 122 Determining the
relationship between redhibition and warranty of fitness when each
is present is critical to this Comment's examination of whether
article 2524 is subsumed by redhibition. If a claim for redhibition
precludes a claim for warranty of fitness when both are present,
then only claims brought under the redhibition article 2520 will
stand as an exception to the exclusivity provision of the Act.
However, if a breach of contract claim under article 2524 can stand
separately from a claim for redhibition, there23is a possibility that it
too will be swept under the Act's exception. 1
While the doctrine of fitness for ordinary use was present in the
jurisprudence and in Louisiana Civil Code article 2475 prior to the
adoption of article 2524, the warranty's history is riddled with
confusion with the warranty of redhibition. 124 The purpose of the
addition of article 2524 to the redhibition chapter was to clarify the
difference between the two warranties-and specifically 125
to
confirm that warranty of fitness is independent of redhibition.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's analysis in Hob's Refrigeration
and Air Conditioning,Inc. v. Poche (Hob's Refrigeration)not only
underscores the difficulty in distinguishing redhibition and
warranty of fitness due to the close overlap of subject matter, 126 but
also illustrates that the relationship between the two warranties is
unclear when a claim for each is present. In Hob 's Refrigeration,
The installer-seller of an air conditioner sued for payment of
services rendered, which included the installation of a compressor
122. Stroderd,2005 WL 2037419, at *3.
123. The effect of this will be to widen liability of manufacturers by allowing
plaintiffs to assert an additional breach of contract claim than has traditionally
been recognized by the courts since the enactment of the LPLA.
124. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmts. a, c (1996) (The legislature notes
that while recognized by the courts, the warranty has been confused with
redhibition). See 1993 La. Acts. No. 841; Bilbe, supra note 5, at 138-41.
125. Bilbe, supra note 5, at 139. Article 2524 is not a subset of redhibition,
but instead the two concepts are different implied warranties. Hob's
Refrigeration & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326, 327 (La.
1974). The comments to article 2524 make it clear that a violation of the
warranty of fitness is a separate cause of action, one under breach of contract,
allowing the buyer to seek dissolution or damages or both even though the
product is free from redhibitory defects. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. b
(1996); 1993 La. Acts. No. 841, V. Redhibition; Lundy Enters., L.L.C. v. Shelby
Williams Indus., No. 01-3291, 2003 WL 282328, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2003)
(in dicta); Cunard Line Ltd. Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109, 113-14 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 2006); Bilbe, supra note 5, at 125.
126. Bilbe, supra note 5, at 139-40.
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into a unit sold to the defendant-buyer. 127 The defendant-buyer
argued that the compressor was a replacement compressor and that
the original was defective. 28 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal stated that the defendant should have brought an action
for redhibition against the installer-seller, and despite the original
defect, the defendant-buyer was liable for the open account. 127The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, citing article 2475's implied
warranty of fitness language.' 30 Justice Tate noted that the
"compressor did not comply with the implied warranty of fitness
for the purpose for which purchased" since the price paid gave rise
to a reasonable expectation that the rebuilt unit would last more
than three months. 3' This case illustrates an attempt by the Court
to recognize warranty of fitness as independently viable, but its
rationale is undermined by the i32fact that the defendant-buyer's
claim stemmed from redhibition.
Later, the legislature's addition of article 2524 to the
redhibition chapter confirmed the idea that the two warranties are
distinct, as set forth in Hob's Refrigeration,'33 but the underlying
weakness in the court's analysis remains unresolved: knowing that
a breach of contract claim under article 2524 is independently
cognizable from a claim for redhibition does not shed light on the
viability of each when both warranties are present. An example of
a situation giving rise to a claim for redhibition and one for article
2524 can be seen by returning to the Harry hypothetical, but an
important distinction must be made: specifically, whether the two
claims arise out of the same or different35 characteristics 134 of the
product sold by the manufacturer-seller. 1
In the original hypothetical, Harry's redhibition, LPLA, and
article 2524 claims are all based on the same characteristic of the
product, i.e., the brakes. In this situation, the truck is unfit for its
ordinary use under article 2524 since it cannot haul sand without
brakes, and thus it is not fit for Harry's intended use. It is
127. Hob's Refrigeration, 304 So. 2d at 327.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130.

Id.

131. Id. at 328.
132. Bilbe, supra note 5, at 139-40.
133. It should be noted that the bill for the revision cited Hob 's Refrigeration
when discussing the addition of article 2524. 1993 La. Acts. No. 841; Bilbe,
supra note 5, at 139-40.
134.

This Comment uses the word "characteristic" because "defect" is laden

with references to redhibition. Thus, "characteristic" is used to signify the problem
in the product that gives rise to any claim available to the claimant-buyer.
135. This Comment presumes that Harry has an "unreasonably dangerous"
LPLA claim so that the governing exclusivity language is present.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

redhibitorily defective because Harry would not have bought it had
he known of the bad brakes. It falls under the LPLA because it was
unreasonably dangerous in design during its reasonably anticipated
use. In this instance, Harry's article 2524 warranty of fitness claim
is tied to the defect that gives rise to the LPLA exclusivity and
damage provisions,
the situation contemplated throughout this
36
Comment.'
On the other hand, imagine a different Harry scenario where he
purchases a dump truck from the manufacturer-seller for the
express purposes of hauling sand. During the purchase, Harry
communicates to the manufacturer that the purchase of the truck is
for the specific purpose of hauling sand. Harry then contracts with
a third party to haul sand, but during an attempted haul discovers
that the truck is not properly sealed for Harry's purposes, and the
sand leaks out. Additionally, the brakes on the dump truck fail and
cause it to crash, destroying company equipment and injuring poor
Harry. In this situation, the truck is unfit under article 2524 due to
its inability to haul sand, but there are also separate redhibition and
LPLA claims. For example, the redhibition claim is based on the
defective brakes in the truck, which caused "economic loss"
damage in the form of the loss of Harry's hauling equipment and
"damage to the product itself' in the form of the totaled dump
truck. An LPLA claim is also available for Harry's personal injury
caused by the unreasonably dangerous product, i.e., poor
composition or design of the truck's brakes. The presence of the
unreasonably dangerous product status triggers the LPLA's
exclusivity and damage provisions. This Comment focuses on the
first hypothetical because there are obvious and compelling policy
reasons to allow
Harry to recover for all three claims in the second
137
hypothetical.

136. This situation is analogous to the one presented to the court in Hob's
Refrigeration, 304 So. 2d 326.
137. It is unfair to allow a manufacturer to escape his liability for breach of
contract in the cases where the article 2524 claim arises out of a separate
characteristic in the product than the redhibition and LPLA claims. Absent the
damage caused by the defective brakes, the plaintiff-buyer would be in the same
position as the plaintiff-buyer in the hypothetical discussed in footnote twelve,
and all of the same policy reasons to allow him to recover are in place. A
fortiori, to bar this plaintiffs claim on the grounds that he has independent
injuries arising from independent redhibition and LPLA claims would punish
him just because he is more injured than the plaintiff in the hypothetical
presented in footnote twelve. Instead, it is most equitable in these cases to apply
the plain language of the LPLA "Damage" provision only to the theories of
liability that arise out of the defect from which the LPLA claim arose, which
allows article 2524 to stand outside the umbrella exclusivity and "Damage"
provision effects.
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Returning to the Stroderd discussion, the court based its second
conclusion that article 2524 is not viable against a manufacturer
because it is subsumed by redhibition138 on comment (b) of article
2524, which reads:
Under this article when the thing sold is not fit for its
ordinary use, even though it is free from redhibitory
defects, the buyer may seek dissolution of the sale and
damages, or just damages, under the general rules of
conventional obligations. The buyer's action in such a case
arising from
is one for breach of contract and not the action
39
the warranty against redhibitory defects.'
The Stroderd court contends that the comment "implies" that
warranty of fitness can only be an independent claim when a
redhibitory defect is absent, but Stroderd's claim is unpersuasive
for two reasons.
First, the court cites PPG Industries v. Industrial Laminates
Corporation(PPG)as supportive of this proposition, but that case
is clearly distinguishable. '" PPG is a pre-LPLA and pre-"Sales"
revision case dealing with whether an express warranty claim
under article 2529 is subsumed by redhibition. Yet, article 2529 on
express warranty should be treated differently from warranty of
fitness under article 2524. The text of article 2529 states that
"when the thing the seller has delivered, though in itself is free
from redhibitory defects, is not of the kind or quality specified in
the contract," the buyer's rights are under conventional
The plain language and natural structure of the
obligations.
sentence require that only when the thing is free from redhibitory
defects is the buyer's express warranty claim governed by the
articles on conventional obligations. This conclusion is further
supported by two comments.
To the contrary, article 2524's plain language and comments
do not support the conclusion that redhibition trumps when both
are present. 143 There is no language that triggers the rules on
conventional obligations in the absence of a redhibitory defect, as
is present in article 2529.144 Instead, the third paragraph confers the
138. Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corp., No. 04-3040, 2005 WL 2037419, at
*3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005).
139. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. b (1996).
140. Stroderd, 2005 WL 2037419, at *2 (citing PPG Indus. vs. Indus.
Laminates Corp., 664 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1982)).
141. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2529 (1996 & Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
142. Id. cmt. b (1996); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 cmt. b (1996).
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
144. Id.
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right to proceed under the rules for conventional obligations upon
both fitness for ordinary and particular use and is not subject to any
similar inhibitory language.' 5 Stroderd relies on the language in
comment (b) to article 2524 for its proposition, 46 but even this
language is unsupportive. Unlike the text in article 2529, the
comment to article 2524 states that "[u]nder this article when the
thing sold is not fit for its ordinary use, even though it is free from
redhibitory defects," the buyer's remedies are in contract. 147 The
use of the word "even," which is not present in the text of article
2529, connotes that an article 2524 claim is viable in either case,
with or without the presence of a redhibitory defect.' 48 Read as a
whole, the comment's language marks a distinction between the
two warranties and affirms that a warranty of fitness action is
viable, even in the absence of a redhibitory claim. Reasoning a
contrario, since the text of article 2524 is not subject to the
inhibitory language of article 2529 on express warranty, one can
infer a legislative intent to allow a warranty of fitness 49
claim to
withstand the presence or absence of a redhibitory defect. 1
The second reason why Stroderd's reliance on comment (b)
does not support the finding that article 2524 is subsumed by
redhibition is the timing of the addition of both articles to the Civil
Code. 150 Article 2529 contains language reasonably supporting the
conclusion that it is subsumed by redhibition, while this language
is not present in article 2524. Since both of these warranties were
added to the redhibition chapter in the same act during the "Sales"
title revision, the express language could easily have been added to
make the two articles uniform. I Without this addition, it could
only be presumed that the legislature intended to draw a distinction
145.
146.
Corp.,
147.
148.

Id.
Stroderd, 2005 WL 2037419, at *3; PPG Indus. vs. Indus. Laminates
664 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1982).
LA. CIr. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. b (1996) (emphasis added).
Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. b (1996), with LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2529 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
149. While it can be argued conversely that the two warranties should be
read in parimateria, thus extending the redhibition requirement to the latter, this
rationale is unpersuasive in this instance. As stated previously, the LPLA
incorporated express warranty as a mode of qualifying a product as
"unreasonably dangerous." Therefore, it is appropriate to allow article 2529 to
be subsumed by redhibition because it is already provided under the LPLA. LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.58 (2009). On the other hand, the absence of such

language in article 2524, combined with the fact that it is not incorporated into
the LPLA, suggest that the two articles should be treated as distinguishable.
MURCHISON & TRAHAN, supra note 59, at 168, 171.

150. 1993 La. Acts. No. 841, § 1.
151. Id.
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between express warranty and warranty of fitness with regard to
their relationships with redhibition. Since the legislature used
different language in drafting article 2524 than is used in article
2529, this suggests that they have distinctive interactions with the
warranty of redhibition.
Outside of Stroderd, the state of the law is muddy concerning
the proposition that redhibition subsumes article 2524. Cunard
Line Ltd. Co. v. Datrex, Inc., addresses the question in the
converse, stating the issue as "whether the Louisiana Civil Code
article 2524 is intended to encompass the warranty against
redhibitory defects so as to provide an additional cause of action
for defective products." 152 In Cunard, the court reviewed a trial
court's grant of an exception of prescription where the purchaser of
lighting systems brought suit against the seller for "'defective
design and/or installation' of the systems."' 153 The seller argued
that the one-year prescriptive period for redhibition barred the
buyer's claims, and the buyer countered that the ten-year
prescription for article 2524 was applicable.' 54 The court
concluded that article 2524 "applies to a situation in which the
cause of action is based, not on the defective nature of the thing at
issue, but on its fitness for ordinary use and/or for a particular use
or purpose." Since the plaintiffs cause of action was based on a
defect, the claim was barred by prescription. 55 Simply put, Cunard
stands for the proposition that a claim based on a defect in a thing
is governed by redhibition and not warranty of fitness.
The court posited that the legislature must have intended to
enact three different types of warranties applicable to sales since
they gave no mention or reasoning for an overlap, and it would be
"superfluous or redundant" to have three articles governing the
same subject matter.' 5 6 In the instances that an article 2524 claim
arises out of a redhibitory defect, there is a degree of overlap that
would suggest that allowing the warranty of fitness claim is not
necessary for a plaintiff to recover.1 57 Redhibition under the LPLA
is recoverable to the extent of "economic loss" or "damage to the
product itself," which in essence would be the type of recovery

152. 926 So. 2d 109, 113 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006).
153. Id. at 113.
154. Id. at 111-12.
155. Id. at 114.
156. Id. at 113. The three warranties are LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (1996
& Supp. 2009) (redhibition), LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 (1996 & Supp.
2009) (thing fit for ordinary use), and LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2529 (1996 &
Supp. 2009) (thing not of the kind specified in the contract).
157. See supra Part 1.
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158
sought by a plaintiff pursuing a breach of contract claim.
Moreover, since a manufacturer is presumed to be a bad faith seller
under redhibition, the court can allocate attorneys' fees, which are
typically only available in breach of contract claims when they are
stipulated by the parties.15 9
Thus, the extent of Harry's recoverability is not affected if we
allow redhibition to subsume his breach of contract claim under
article 2524. Harry has three types of losses: (1) personal injury
damages; (2) damage to the dump truck; and (3) damages owed to
the third party for breaching the sand-hauling obligation.
Assuming that Harry can prove that the dump truck is an
unreasonably dangerous product, his LPLA claim will cover his
personal injuries. The redhibition exception to the Act will cover
the other two types of damages: damage to the product itself and
the economic losses he suffered from breaching the contract.
However, there is no express language or provision in the Civil
Code that gives preference to a claim for redhibition over article
2524-as in the case of an express warranty-and it may be unfair
to give such preference in a case like Harry's. Even though the
buyer is able to bring a redhibitory action within one year of his
discovery of the defect for the "economic loss" owed to the third
party, he is vulnerable to suit by the third party with which he
contracted under general conventional obligations' ten-year
prescription. 60 It follows, then, that if the buyer is not litigious, he
bears the brunt of the losses caused by the defective product. While
the plaintiff can use a prescribed cause of action as a defense under
Code of Civil Procedure article 424, the buyer still bears the costs
of defending against litigation without remedy against the at-fault
manufacturer who is deemed a bad faith seller under article
2545.161 Even though the recovery available to a plaintiff is
virtually the same under article 2524 and redhibition in the context
of damage caused by a manufacturer's products, allowing
redhibition to subsume article 2524 when the warranty of fitness
claim arises from a defect potentially shortchanges a vulnerable
buyer in terms of prescription.
These inequities would exist if the third party sues Harry for
breach of contract after his own right to bring a redhibition action
against the manufacturer-seller of the truck has prescribed.

158. Id.
159. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (1996 & Supp. 2009); LrrvINOFF, supra
note 33, at 363.
160. Kennedy, Dimension of Time, supra note 10, at 16; Bilbe, supra note 5,
at 144.
161. Interview with William Crawford, supranote 11.
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Remember that Harry only has one year from the discovery of the
bad brakes to sue the manufacturer, while the third party has ten
years to sue Harry for his failure to haul sand. Allowing the LPLA
to subsume an article 2524 claim forces Harry to eat the
manufacturer's liability,
even though the manufacturer is presumed
162
to be in bad faith.
Thus, in certain instances in which a purchaser has a breach of
contract claim under article 2524, an LPLA claim, and a
redhibition claim, it would be beneficial to a good faith buyer for
purposes of prescription to permit the article 2524 claim.
Moreover, if the redhibition prescriptive period has tolled, the
plaintiff will not be recovering twice for the economic losses
coverable by both redhibition and article 2524. Furthermore, since
the recovery is greater for plaintiffs to proceed under redhibition
due to the availability of attorneys' fees, 163 plaintiffs will not be
incentivized to allow their redhibition claims to prescribe so as to
reap the benefit of a longer prescriptive period under article
2524.164 Rather, allowing article 2524 to operate after the
redhibition claim upon which it is based prescribes will protect
plaintiffs who are subject to suit by third parties due to the failure
of the product, thus providing recovery of any losses incurred in
spite of the manufacturer who potentially knew their intended use
for the product. 65 Consequently, it is not clear whether the
legislature intended redhibition to subsume article 2524.166
However, in some instances there are compelling reasons to allow
a fitness claim to stand.
IV. CONCLUSION

So is Harry's breach of contract claim subsumed by the Act or
redhibition? This Comment suggests that the plain language and
legislative history contemporary with the addition of article 2524
to the Louisiana Civil Code undermine the conclusion in Stroderd
with respect to whether an article 2524 claim is subsumed by the
LPLA. Theoretically, the LPLA does not subsume a breach of
contract claim for warranty of fitness. However, Stroderd may be
correct in its assertion that the redhibition claim subsumes
warranty of fitness when both claims arise out of the same
162. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
163. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
164. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 (1996 & Supp. 2009); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2520 (1996 & Supp. 2009).
165. See supra Part III.C.
166. Bilbe, supranote 5, at 141.
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characteristic. On the other hand, a claim for warranty of fitness
when it arises out of redhibitory defect may not exist at all. 167 This
is a logical conclusion when the remedies available for each claim
are considered.
One of the main goals of the LPLA was to provide stability and
certainty to the realm of manufacturer liability. 68 Stroderd's
interpretation of the scope of the Act following the revision of the
"Sales" title undermines the gains sought and initially achieved by
the drafters of the Act since it creates an inconsistency with the
plain language. While an examination of the legislative history
suggests that it is unlikely that the legislature intended to preserve
warranty of fitness from the exclusivity of the Act, the plain
language of the damage provision encompasses article 2524 in its
protection. However, whether a warranty of fitness claim can
surmount the preemptive force of redhibition when based on the
same defect is difficult to definitively confirm, but there may be
compelling prescriptive reasons to allow the contract claim to
survive. One scholar predicted that "[t]he effect [of the Act] will be
to cut back upon the Civil Code's role in products liability and to
channel these important cases into the sphere of tort." 169 Whether
this prediction will come to fruition is dependent upon a ruling
from the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguishing the Stroderd rule
or an act by the legislature amending the damage provision to
affirm it.
Larissa Teipner*

167. See supra Part III.C.3.
168. Gamer, supra note 20, at 164.
169. Id.at 134-35.
* The author would like to extend special thanks to William Crawford,
John Church, and Brad Kline for their guidance and their contribution to this
Comment.

